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Abstract
This paper studies whether the performance and outreach of micronance in-
stitutions are inuenced by the context in which the institutions operate. Speci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cally, panel data from 2004-2008 is used to estimate models of several dimensions of
outreach and performance. Results suggest that achievements of micronance in-
stitutions are linked to the context in which the institutions operate. In particular,
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1 Introduction
Access to nancial services for poorer population segments is increasingly recognized as
crucial for poverty alleviation. Micronance has received much attention among devel-
opment policymakers and organizations during the past decades. But how can policies
improve the situation of micronance institutions (MFIs) and can MFIs be compared
across the very diverse contexts in which they operate? For example, consider the fact
that the concentration of MFIs is larger in Asia and Latin America than in Africa, even
though per capita income is lower in Africa. This may suggest that MFIs are attracted by
certain contextual conditions. Also within regions, di¤erences can be observed. Take for
example two large and widely imitated MFIs, Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) and Grameen
Bank of Bangladesh. Ahlin et. al. (2009) question whether the larger nancial sustain-
ability of BRI during the 1980s and 1990s was in fact caused by the much higher levels
of economic growth in Indonesia than in Bangladesh. Also, other external factors than
purely macroeconomic conditions may matter. If, for example, two countries otherwise
comparable in economic characteristics di¤er in legal rights of their citizens, corruption
levels or business environment in general, does this inuence di¤erently the ability of MFIs
in each of the two countries to reach their target population or to become sustainable?
This paper addresses these questions in order to better understand the role of MFIs in the
development process, and in order to inform stakeholders such as regulators, investors,
donors and rating agencies.
Good organizational performance of MFIs does not ensure that clients actually benet
from the presence of MFIs. The framework used for assessing MFI performance should
therefore incorporate the value to clients along with institutional performance - or in
other words, focus should not only be on protability measures. Hence, the analysis and
hypotheses in this paper are based on a framework developed by Schreiner (2002). This
framework includes aspects of nancial performance, sustainability, worth to clients and
the extent to which the MFI reach certain target groups of the population. Schreiner
(2002) describes two archetypical approaches which can be chosen by a MFI. The poverty
approach implies an e¤ort to reach the poorest and most vulnerable groups of the pop-
ulation, while the costs of this deep outreach may be so high that the MFI is unable to
cover its costs. In contrast, the self-sustainability approach is based on an assumption
that reaching a large number of clients (who do not belong to the poorest of the poor) for
a long time period compensate for the inability to protably reach the poorest groups. In
reality, most MFIs are located somewhere in between these two extremes.
The rst hypothesis to be tested is derived from these approaches. It states thatMFIs
are more likely to follow the poverty approach in contexts with a more developed nancial
sector. The hypothesis is based on an assumption that as the nancial sector develops
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and the number of nancial service providers increases, MFIs are likely to specialize;
whereas in countries with less developed nancial sectors, there is more room for MFIs
to reach a larger number of clients (the self-sustainability approach). This hypothesis
is conrmed by the empirical evidence presented in this paper. The second hypothesis
states that quality of public institutions, business environment and governance positively
inuence sustainability, breadth and depth of outreach of the MFI. This hypothesis is
in part conrmed, but it is found that di¤erent aspects of governance and institutional
quality matter for di¤erent dimensions of outreach. Institutional quality may also be
related to either of the approaches described above, and this study will also shed some
light on that question, although no hypothesis is set up a priori.
A growing body of literature is concerned with identication of factors behind suc-
cessful MFIs in an attempt to learn what works in micronance. Most of this literature
concentrate on the determinants internal to the MFI, such as governance (e.g. Mersland
and Strøm, 2009; Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei, 2008), ownership (e.g. Mersland and
Strøm, 2008), regulation (e.g. Hatarska and Nadolnyak, 2007), lending methodology and
costs (e.g. Cull et.al, 2007), and outreach and portfolio quality (e.g. Ayayi and Sene,
2010). The often postulated trade-o¤ between outreach and e¢ ciency facing MFIs (see
e.g. Conning, 1999) has also received some attention (e.g. Hermes et.al., forthcoming).
External determinants of MFI performance have been the focus of a much more limited
number of studies. Mueller and Uhde (2009) study the impact of external governance
on the performance and outreach of MFIs. They nd from panel-data models evidence
that external governance positively a¤ect the protability of the MFIs, while it negatively
a¤ects depth of outreach. Ahlin et. al. (2009) also use a cross country dataset to study
the macroeconomic determinants of MFI performance and nd that MFI performance is
linked to the broader economy. Vanroose and DEspallier (2009) analyze the relation-
ship between MFI performance and the development of the nancial sector. They nd
that MFI outreach and protability is larger in countries with low levels of access to the
formal nancial system. Finally, Crabb (2008) study the relationship between measures
of economic freedom and sustainability of MFIs and nd that only a few indicators are
important in explaining sustainability.
The results from these earlier studies are complementary to the present, and to the
extent that there is overlap, the results generally point in the same direction. The present
study di¤ers in at least three respects. First, we use a di¤erent methodological approach
by specically taking advantage of the panel-structure of the data while employing quan-
tile - especially median - regression. This is important as outliers may have a large
inuence on conditional mean estimates. Second, the set of explanatory variables is more
focused on business environment, economic freedom and governance than on macroeco-
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nomic conditions. And third, we focus more on outreach and not so much on institution
growth and costs than comparable studies. Selection of outcome variables is based on the
theoretical framework due to Schreiner (2002). The length of outreach is often closely
linked to the sustainability of the institution, so protability and sustainability are in
this study viewed as subsets of the broader framework, outreach. Globally, only a small
fraction of MFIs are nancially sustainable, probably around 3-5 percent of the estimated
10000 MFIs worldwide1 (Allen, 2007). And it remain debated whether nancial sustain-
ability is indeed a desirable goal for a MFI at all (see e.g. Bateman, 2010). However,
governments may have good reasons to prefer subsidies in ensuring long term provision of
nancial access to poorer population segments. This is taken into account in this analysis
by treating subsidies as an equally valid funding source as funding from nancial markets.
The impact of a good business environment on MFI performance and outreach may
come through two channels. First, a good business environment is conducive for en-
trepreneurs who are typically clients of the MFI. Even for people too poor to start a
formal business - who are typical customers of depth-oriented MFIs - the general business
environment is important for success. Second, a good business environment may be ad-
vantageous for the MFI itself. It is not possible to distinguish between these two e¤ects in
the empirical design of the present study. As long as a non-sector specic focus on busi-
ness environment is taken, which of these channels the impact works through does not
matter for practical policy purposes. For consideration of policies with a sector specic
focus, more detailed, country specic analysis are needed. Generally, a thriving external
environment, for example in the form of good governance, basically stimulate savings and
investment behavior (Baland et.al., 2010).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and discusses data. Section 3
presents the methodology used. Section 4 presents central results, while section 5 presents
and discusses extensions to and robustness of the analysis, including a discussion of simpler
outcome measures. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 MFI level data
The data source for information on the MFIs is the MIX (Micronance Information eX-
change), an online platform for exchange of nancial and social performance data and
benchmarking across MFIs. The database is comprehensive, with the number of partici-
1However, MFIs having achieved nancial sustainability serve a large fraction of the clients worldwide.
Allen (2007) estimate that more than 80% of MFI clients are served by fewer than 10% of the largest
MFIs and further notes that sustainable MFIs tend to be large scale.
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pating MFIs exceeding 1500. The main issue directing choice of sources for data on MFIs
is the trade-o¤ between representativity and coverage. Truly representative samples of
micronance institutions require surveys which are often quite expensive to construct,
and thus they are often characterized by a relatively low number of observations. On the
other hand, using data from MIX has the advantage of a larger number of observations,
which come at the cost of representativity since reporting to the database is in principle
voluntary2. Data is self-reported and often validated from other sources by MIX sta¤. To
increase the reliability of the ndings, the sample used here is restricted to institutions
rated 4 or 5 diamonds by MIX; that is, institutions for which data is supported by audited
nancial statements and possibly also rating and due diligence reports. The pool of MFIs
reporting su¢ cient quality data to MIX to be rated 4 or 5 diamonds is not representative
of the micronance industry as a whole. Larger institutions focused on nancial sustain-
ability are overrepresented in the dataset (Bauchet and Morduch, 2010). In a sense, this
selection is positive, as it removes noise and possibly reduce measurement errors resulting
from including smaller units. But obviously, results should be interpreted keeping in mind
that they are based on a subsample of relatively large and well-established MFIs. In terms
of number of borrowers reached by the institutions included in the analysis, the dataset
has a quite large coverage3. In the estimation utilizing the largest number of observations,
data from 680 MFIs in 83 countries observed in the years 2004 - 2008 is used.
[Table 1]
2.2 Dependent variables
In line with previous studies (e.g. Hatarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Mueller and Uhde,
2009), operational self-su¢ ciency (OSS) is used as the prime indicator of nancial per-
formance. This variable is constructed as the ratio of nancial revenue to nancial cost.
A value larger than unity thus means that the MFI is operationally self-su¢ cient as costs
can be covered by generated revenue. Using OSS as a measure of sustainability is pre-
ferred to measures such as Return on Assets or Financial Self Su¢ ciency (Cull et. al.,
2007), as the level of subsidies and donations is included. This means that also the ability
of the MFI management to attract subsidies is taken into account by this measure. The
ability to attract funding is becoming more important as the number of MFIs is growing,
and subsidies may be a funding source equally attractive for the MFI as funding from
ordinary capital markets.
2Often, however, donors require institutions to report to MIX in order to provide subsidies.
3It is estimated that more than 80 percent of the MFI clients worldwide are served by fewer than 10
percent of the largest MFIs (Allen, 2007).
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Acknowledging that the mission of MFIs often include more than achieving self-
su¢ ciency, we study other dimensions of outreach in addition to nancial performance. To
this end, the broader conceptual framework of outreach developed by Schreiner (2002) is
followed to the extent possible by the available data. For comparative purposes, Schreiner
identies two extreme approaches to micronance. The poverty approach targets very
poor clients, who are often costly to serve. And the self-sustainability approach targets
less poor individuals on the fringe of the formal nancial system. Furthermore, Schreiner
identies six dimensions of outreach, of which we identied measures available from the
MIX dataset for ve. The six aspects and corresponding measures are:
 Cost to clients, dened as the sum of price and transaction costs. We focus on price
costs, which for a MFI can be decomposed into nancial costs, operational costs
and loan loss costs. These three dimensions are represented by the ratio of nancial
expenses to assets, a measure of costs per borrower, and portfolio quality measured
as portfolio at risk > 30 days4, respectively.
 Depth of outreach is the value that society attaches to the net gain of a given
client. Often, certain individuals have higher weight in the social welfare function,
for example poor people and women. Often, average loan size is used as a proxy for
depth of outreach, although it may be incomplete. The approach taken here follows
this tradition and use average loan balance as a proxy for depth of outreach. In
addition, we also use the percentage of female clients in the MFI.
 Breadth of outreach is the number of clients. A number of measures are available
in the data, the most reliable probably being the number of borrowers. This may
understate the total number of clients by excluding e.g. savings-only clients.
 Length of outreach is the time frame of the supply of micronance. Schreiner sug-
gests prot as an imperfect proxy for length of outreach as it signals the potential
for attracting funds on the market and thus sustain in the market in the longer run.
The rst part of the empirical analysis is concerned with sustainability, so the best
proxy available is probably operational self su¢ ciency (OSS). As mentioned above,
OSS also takes into account the ability of the institution to attract other funding
sources, such as subsidies.
 Scope of outreach is the number of types of nancial contracts supplied. In the
absence of a good estimate of the number of types of nancial contracts supplied
4Portfolio at risk > 30 days expresses the fraction of the total loan portfolio for which repayment is
overdue with more than 30 days.
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by each MFI (and the extent of use of these di¤erent types), this is proxied by the
ratio of depositors to borrowers in the MFI.
 Worth to clients. This is dened as clientswillingness to pay, and as Schreiner
points out, this is di¢ cult to measure. Worth is therefore not explicitly included in
our framework, apart from the indications of worth to clients evidenced from e.g. a
large breadth of outreach.
In this terminology, the poverty approach is based on an assumption that depth of
outreach can compensate for narrow breadth, short length and limited scope, whereas the
self-sustainability approach is based on an assumption that wide breadth, long length and
ample scope can compensate for shallow depth (Schreiner, 2002). Reduced form equations
for each of these outreach dimensions are estimated.
2.3 Measures of macroeconomic conditions
In order to compare institutions across very di¤erent countries, it is important to take into
account the macroeconomic context. The panel structure of the data enables us to control
for unobservable, time-invariant regional characteristics by including region dummies in
the models. In addition, we control for a number of time-varying country-level variables,
mostly obtained from the World Development Indicators database provided by the World
Bank. GDP growth could inuence MFI protability and outreach since growth may
mean increased business opportunities increasing the demand for micronancial services.
Growth may also mean development of the nancial sector, which may work in the oppo-
site direction since substitution possibilities may arise and the competitive pressure facing
the MFI may increase. Not only the change in aggregate welfare (as proxied by GDP)
is important, the level obviously also matters for MFIs. GDP per capita is therefore also
included, acknowledging that this is an average measure which is uninformative about the
distribution of income.
Ination is also related to the propensity to start a business and the likely outcomes
of doing so. Individuals will be less likely to start a business in uncertain or unfavorable
circumstances, which are often also characterized by high ination rates. The ination in
consumer prices is therefore included. Finally, economic density is likely to play a role in
the performance and outreach of MFIs. Financial providers are likely to locate themselves
in areas of relative prosperity and with a relatively dynamic population. These areas
often coincide with areas of economic concentration, to which innovative and dynamic
individuals often are drawn (World Bank, 2009). Since MFIs often cover both rural
and urban areas and di¤er widely in their geographical coverage, economic density is
represented in the models by population density measured as a country average.
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2.4 Data on framework conditions
[Table 2]
Framework conditions likely to impact outreach of MFIs include the business environ-
ment, economic freedom in the country, corruption levels and the quality of governance.
Data on these dimensions are measured at the country level, and does therefore not vary
across MFIs within a given country in a given year. Data on business environment is
from the Doing Business project under the World Bank and the International Finance
Corporation. The project provides an assessment of the ease of doing business through
a number of indicators5. Since 2009, the indicators have been summarized in an Ease of
Doing Business Index used as the basis for a ranking of countries according to the rela-
tive ease of doing business. The underlying indicators are available for the period from
2004 and onwards. Using individual indicators gives the opportunity to identify the most
important of the individual factors for MFI performance and outreach. Indicators in-
cluded here have been selected to reect the smallest of enterprises, as they best represent
the typical MFI client. Since microentrepreneurs do not necessarily work in the formal
economy, the ease of doing business index is probably especially important for the group
of MFIs also serving the SME sector and those following a self-sustainability approach
as described above; though considerable spill-overs from the business environment in the
formal sector to the informal sector are likely.
Economic freedom indicators are constructed and collected by the Heritage Founda-
tion, a conservative think-tank with a mission to promote principles of free enterprise
and limited government intervention. The index of economic freedom is composed of 10
indicators ranging from business freedom to labor freedom, all centered on the economic
environment. Each country is assigned a value between 0 and 100 every year, and these
measures form the basis of an annual ranking of countries according to economic freedom.
Individual indicators as well as the overall measure of economic freedom are used in this
analysis.
Whereas the index of economic freedom is mainly focused on the economic environ-
ment, the last set of indicators is broader in scope, focusing on governance and the political
environment. The Worldwide Governance Indicators have been compiled by the World
Bank since 1996 and cover six dimensions of governance, namely voice and accountabil-
ity, political stability and absence of violence, government e¤ectiveness, regulatory quality,
rule of law and control of corruption6. The indicators are based on survey responses from
5For more information, see http://www.doingbusiness.org.
6Langbein and Knack (2010) provide a critical assessment of the WGI indicators and nd that the 6
indicators actually measure the same broad concept. Due to the fact that the WGI indicators are not
included simultaneously in any of the regressions presented in this paper, this should pose no econometric
problems. However, it should be kept in mind when interpreting results.
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enterprise, citizen and expert surveys in countries around the World.
Indicators related to trade across borders have not been included as the typical MFI
and microentrepreneur are not directly involved in export or import. Regarding measures
of corruption, these are available from more than one of the above mentioned sources.
The correlations among the corruption variables from these sources are very high, so the
measure from Transparency International - which is the most specialized on this particular
subject - has been chosen.
The indicators included span a range from subjectively based WGI measures to more
objectively measured variables such as some of the Doing Business indicators. Both
types of indicators are important. Economic agents act on the basis of their perception.
Perceptions are best reected by the subjectively based measures. The more objectively
measured indicators have the advantage that they are more directly comparable across
countries.
2.5 Control variables at the MFI level
Because of endogeneity concerns arising from the inclusion of nancial variables from the
same MFI on both sides of the estimation equations, ideally only clearly exogenous MFI
control variables should be included. The MFI-specic variables included in all regressions
are therefore age and age squared, dummy variables for micronance focus and regulatory
status as well as institutional type. However, as will be detailed in the next section, a
larger set of MFI-specic control variables is also included in some specications. This
larger set of MFI characteristics include indicators related to institution size (logarithm of
the total number of borrowers), portfolio quality (PaR 30d) and depth of outreach (loga-
rithm of average loan size, proportion of female clients). In line with Ahlin et.al (2009)
these additional variables are lagged by one year to minimize endogeneity concerns. The
indicators included are to a large extent comparable to other studies of MFI performance
(Cull et.al, 2007; Crabb, 2008; Ahlin et.al., 2009; Mueller and Uhde, 2009; Vanroose and
DEspalier, 2009).
3 Methodology
Micronance institutions are heterogenous on observable characteristics. The data is char-
acterized by outliers, which could impact conditional mean regression estimates. There-
fore, median regression is used in most specications. E¤ects of macroeconomic variables
and indicators of framework conditions may di¤er across the range of MFIs, and other
quantiles than the median may thus be informative to consider. In some of the baseline
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specications we therefore also use quantile regression for other quantiles than the me-
dian. Hence, the presentation of the empirical methodology is based on quantile regression
without having a specic quantile in mind. A standard quantile regression model is given
by
Q (yijxi) = xi (1)
where i = 1; : : : ; N denotes the observations, yi is the dependent variable and xi is a
vector of explanatory variables. Q (yijxi) denotes the  -th conditional quantile of y given
x (e.g. Q0:1 (yijxi) denotes the lowest decile of yi given xi). We use this standard quantile
regression model as our baseline model.
It may, however, be argued that outcomes of micronance institutions are determined
by numerous factors, many of which cannot be measured. Econometric approaches have
been developed to utilize panel data to deal with this unobserved heterogeneity. The
standard model used for inference with panel data is
yit = xit + ci + uit (2)
where yit is the dependent variable (say, protability), xit is a vector of explanatory
variables,  is a vector of coe¢ cients, ci is an unobserved individual specic term and
uit is the error term. One appealing solution is to use xed e¤ects, which eliminate the
unobserved heterogeneity by di¤erencing out ci. This comes at the cost of not being able
to estimate the e¤ect of time-invariant variables, as they are di¤erenced out along with
the individual specic term. In the conditional quantile context, a similar di¤erencing
strategy is not feasible, as quantiles are not linear operators, i.e. Q (yit   yisjxi) 6=
Q (yitjxi)   Q (yisjxi) for t 6= s. A relatively simple solution to this issue is to use a
two-step estimator based on Arulampalam et.al. (2007) and Bache et.al. (2009). This
estimator is used initially. The rst step involves estimation of the individual specic term
using the least squares xed e¤ects estimator. Denoting this expectation of the individual
specic term c^i, the second step is a quantile regression of
yit   c^i = xit + uit (3)
Bache et.al. (2009) show that this estimator has a computational advantage over the
approach suggested by Koenker (2004), however it may be less e¢ cient. Since the within-
MFI variation in some of the variables is quite low, other methods than this xed e¤ects
approach are also considered.
An alternative to xed e¤ects models in standard mean regression for panel data is
to specify a model with random e¤ects. This is done by either assuming the individual
specic term ci to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables or allowing a specic
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form of correlation. Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) develop a quantile regression estimator
based on Chamberlains (1984) correlated random e¤ects approach. Chamberlain (1984)
suggested a projection of ci onto the observables for all time periods, that is
ci =  +
TX
t=1
xitt + vi (4)
where T = Ti since the estimator requires a balanced panel. The model thus becomes
yit = xit +  +
TX
t=1
xitt + vi + uit (5)
Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) use this setup in a quantile regression framework. This
requires two additional assumptions, namely
1. vi is independent of xi, and
2. Q (uitjxi; vi) = Q (uitjxit) where xi = (xi1; xi2; : : : ; xiT ).
Assumption 2 implies strict exogeneity, ruling out feedback e¤ects from the dependent
variable to the independent variables. For this reason, we are reluctant to include other
nancial measures at the MFI-level when using nancial measures like protability as our
dependent variable.
The model can be estimated by a quantile regression of the appropriately stacked
relation
y = D + r (6)
where y = (y01; y
0
2; : : : ; y
0
N)
0 and r = v + u. The corresponding parameter vector is  =
( ; 0; 01; : : : ; 
0
T )
0. However, this estimation procedure only works for balanced panels.
As we only observe 57% of the MFIs in the panel in all time periods, using only this
subsample to gain a balanced panel would not be desirable. Apart from the reduction in
the number of observations used in the estimations, selection issues may also arise. And
furthermore, as noted by Bache et.al (2009), the number of parameters to be estimated in
the above specication increases quickly with T . They therefore propose a mean-projected
correlated random e¤ects (MPCRE) model which overcomes both of these problems and
which will therefore be used in this study. Along the lines of Mundlak (1978), ci is instead
approximated by averages of the observed covariates, namely
ci =  + xi + vi (7)
with xi = T 1i
PTi
t=1 xit. The parameter vector is now  = ( ; 
0; 0)0, and the model can
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be estimated similarly to the Abrevaya and Dahl model, and with similar assumptions
(Bache et. al., 2009).
Standard errors for the MPCRE coe¢ cient estimates are bootstrapped. Since there
may be unobserved MFI specic variation, the observations cannot be assumed to be inde-
pendent within MFIs. The standard asymptotic variance formula (Koenker and Bassett,
1978) and the standard bootstrap approach can therefore not be applied. Instead, the
bootstrap samples consist of "blocks" containing all observations over the time dimension
for the selected MFIs.
Obviously, the e¤ect of time invariant variables on yi cannot be identied separately
from the indirect e¤ect through ci in the MPCRE model. This can be seen by realizing
that for a time invariant variable (say, z), zit = zi and consequently, both cannot be
included in the regression. In this application, a number of institutional characteristics
included in the models are time-invariant. In addition, the country-level variables often
show relatively little variation over the time period covered by the data. For each of the
variables with limited time variation, this generates multicollinearity between the variable
and the mean of the variable when this is included in the model. For that reason, the
country specic measures of framework conditions are only included in the main estimation
equation and not in the projection of ci on the explanatory variables.
Summing up, the following strategy is used. First, the baseline model is estimated
with the MPCRE estimator, the 2SFE and simpler estimators. Second, the models are
extended to include a number of other (time varying) control variables at the MFI level,
as detailed above. Because of endogeneity concerns arising from the inclusion of simulta-
neously determined nancial indicators at the MFI level on both sides of the estimation
equation, these additional variables are lagged by one period before inclusion in the mod-
els7. Third, the indicators of macroeconomic conditions and framework conditions are
included sequentially in the baseline models. A selection of these results is presented in
the next section. The advantage of using multiple estimation strategies is the reduction
in the risk of type I errors, that is, the risk of wrongly accepting the alternative hypoth-
esis by declaring a variable signicant. This is important as a large number of equations
are estimated, thus increasing the probability of this type of errors being present in the
results.
7To the extent that there is persistence in these variables, endogeneity can still remain an issue (Ahlin
et. al, 2009).
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4 Results
A large number of model specications have been estimated. This section presents se-
lected results. First, results from estimation of the baseline specication of models for
protability and outreach by di¤erent approaches are presented. And the second part is
concerned with the results from MPCRE estimations including the di¤erent indicators of
framework conditions. For interpretation of the baseline results, it could be useful to note
that MFIs around the threshold of being operationally sustainable (OSS = 1) are located
at the 25th quantile. So the quantile regression results for OSS at  = :25 are especially
relevant for the group of MFIs around the sustainability threshold, which could guide
policies aiming at supporting this group in their possible aim to become sustainable8.
4.1 Baseline results and model comparisons
[Table 3]
[Table 4]
Results from estimation of baseline models with OLS, Fixed E¤ects, Random E¤ects
and pooled quantile regression are reported in tables 3 and 4. As dependent variable is
used OSS. Table 3 reports the baseline results without the additional MFI-specic con-
trols. The macroeconomic variables GDP per capita and GDP growth are signicant in
the OLS and quantile regression models. GDP growth is seen to have higher impact for
the more sustainable MFIs, that is MFIs located in the higher end of the distribution of
OSS. Institutional type also matters, especially being an NGO is associated with a higher
degree of operational self su¢ ciency among the most self su¢ cient institutions, whereas
it is associated with lower self su¢ ciency in the lower part of the distribution. Parameter
estimates in the panel data models (FE and RE) are generally not signicant. Includ-
ing the additional (lagged) MFI-specic controls (table 4) yields similar results, although
institutional type seems to be more signicant in explaining OSS - with di¤erential im-
pacts across institution type and the distribution of OSS. The e¤ect of GDP per capita
vanishes in the higher quantiles so that a highly sustainable institution is not inuenced
much by the average income in the country in which it operates. A higher average loan
balance is associated with a higher degree of sustainability - apart from at the high end
of the distribution where the parameter is insignicant. This is an indication of a trade-
o¤ between depth of outreach and sustainability, mainly for the institutions with lower
values of OSS. Also, larger breadth of outreach and worse portfolio quality (PaR > 30
days) is associated with higher OSS. These ndings are in line with expectations from
8See also section 5.1 in which the issue of sustainability is treated further.
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the theoretical framework. For example, the results indicate that MFIs with relatively
low OSS are likely to have higher depth of outreach and lower breadth of outreach, which
indicates that these MFIs follow the poverty approach described above. Finally, the share
of female clients in the MFI does not matter for OSS, except in the lowest part of the
distribution.
[Table 5]
Turning to the other outreach dimensions, a diverse picture is revealed. Table 5
reports results from MPCRE models with each of the selected outreach indicators as
dependent variables. In addition to standard errors reported for each coe¢ cient, it is also
reported whether the coe¢ cient has the same sign and is simultaneously signicant at
10% level in a 2SFE model and an ordinary median regression model. The condence
in the robustness of estimated relationships is thus bigger when a given variable enters
signicantly in all models. Generally, when this is the case, magnitudes of coe¢ cient
estimates are comparable among the three models though they are not expected to be
identical given the inherent di¤erences in estimation methodology. As described above, I
use the framework of Schreiner (2002) in the assessment of determinants of outreach. For
each of the outreach dimensions, an indication of the expected sign for the coe¢ cients
given that the MFI follows one or the other of the two approaches described above are
provided in the upper part of table 5.
One of the most important macroeconomic determinants of outreach that can be
identied from table 5 is GDP per capita. Financial and operational costs are higher
in countries with higher GDP per capita, which is to be expected given e.g. higher
employment costs. Correspondingly, average loan size increases with GDP per capita.
Looking at this gure in isolation would suggest that depth of outreach is lower in countries
with high income, but there is some evidence from the 2SFE model that the proportion
of female clients increases with GDP per capita. This suggests that the strategy chosen
by a MFI depend on the income level of the country in which it operates. The other three
basic macroeconomic variables are not able to explain more than a few of the outreach
dimensions.
Next, consider ownership as represented by institutional type. Whereas only NGOs
showed a di¤erent pattern in explaining OSS, looking at cost of outreach it turns out
that predicted median costs per borrower for all institutional types represented in table
5 are lower than for the base category, banks (except for the "other" category). On the
other hand, it can also be seen that the prediction on breadth of outreach is lower for
all non-bank institutions compared to banks. The two other institutional characteris-
tics also play a role. Having focus on micronance operations is associated with higher
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depth as measured by proportion of female clients, but also larger breadth of outreach.
Regulated institutions seem to be more likely to follow the self-sustainability approach.
Being regulated is associated with lower depth of outreach (average loan size) and higher
breadth.
Among the included institution-specic factors, two relevant observations should be
stressed. First, like in the baseline models for sustainability, theoretical predictions are
met in most cases where signicance is established. If MFIs follow either the poverty ap-
proach or the sustainability approach, predictions of correlations between outcome vari-
ables can be made. For example, breadth of outreach should be negatively related to
depth of outreach. This is conrmed when depth of outreach is measured as average
loan size, by the signicant and negative coe¢ cient on the number of borrowers in the
model of average loan size. However, the average loan size variable is not signicant in
explaining breadth of outreach. This may be caused by the fact that lagged values of
these institution specic characteristics are used to minimize endogeneity concerns. The
second observation to be stressed is that the measures of depth of outreach are seen to be
internally consistent, and also in line with expectations. This can be seen by the signif-
icant and negative coe¢ cient on the (lagged) average proportion of female clients in the
model of average loan size, and vice versa.
4.2 The impact of framework conditions
[Table 6]
The impact of framework conditions on the di¤erent outreach dimensions is assessed by
estimating a MPCRE model with each of the indicators of framework conditions included
as an explanatory variable. Each of these models controls for the variables included in the
models reported in table 5 as well. This procedure ensures that results for these variables
are considered after basic di¤erences across MFIs and economic contexts have been con-
trolled for. Results are reported in table 6. Like above, in addition to standard errors and
associated signicance levels, table 6 also reports on the incidences in which signicance
is simultaneously established in a similar 2SFE and an ordinary median regression model.
Recall that the rst hypothesis to be addressed states that MFIs are more likely to
follow the poverty approach in contexts with a more developed nancial sector. This
relates to the rst group of indicators in table 6. The credit rights index is not very im-
portant for the di¤erent outreach dimensions. However, the two other measures of credit
market conditions are seen to be more important. Private credit coverage is an indicator
of the ease of obtaining credit for private purposes, including for microentrepreneurs and
SMEs, and thereby an (imperfect) indicator of available substitutes for the products and
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services o¤ered by MFIs. It is therefore also an indicator of the competitive pressure
facing the MFI. An indication of the importance of the competitive pressure is that OSS
is decreasing with larger private credit coverage. It can also be seen that as private credit
coverage increase, depth of outreach measured by average loan size increase, and breadth
of outreach decreases. In other words, MFIs in settings with high private credit coverage
are more likely to follow the poverty approach. Financial freedom is a measure of bank-
ing security as well as a measure of independence from government control. Therefore,
it does not directly measure the level of development of the nancial sector. MFIs in
countries with high nancial freedom have higher nancial expenses, higher average loan
size, a higher breadth (larger number of clients); and less pronounced (i.e. signicant
in the MPCRE and median regressions only) lower portfolio quality and higher costs
per borrower. Based on the measures of average loan size and breadth of outreach, a
context with larger nancial freedom is seen to be associated with MFIs following the
self-sustainability approach. The level of nancial sector development is probably best
proxied by the level of credit coverage, and this assumption leads to a partial conrmation
of the rst hypothesis. Higher degree of nancial sector competition is indeed related to
MFIs following the poverty approach.
We then turn to the second hypothesis, which stated that quality of public insti-
tutions, business environment and governance positively inuence sustainability, breadth
and depth of outreach of the MFI. While assessing the evidence on this hypothesis, we also
look for patterns in relation to the poverty approach and the self-sustainability approach.
First, consider the indicators of business environment. The indicator which enters
signicantly in most of the models is time required to pay taxes. This can be interpreted
as a measure of bureaucracy, but it should also be noted that especially in developing
countries institutional quality is likely to increase with the time required to pay taxes, as
systems with poorly functioning public sectors typically also have lower revenue gener-
ating capacity9. More generally, an inverse-U relation between institutional quality and
time required to pay taxes may be hypothesized. Longer time required to pay taxes sig-
nicantly reduce nancial expenses and depth of outreach measured as the proportion of
female clients. At the same time, it increases OSS and portfolio quality. From the 2SFE
and ordinary median regression models, there is also evidence that MFIs in environments
in which it takes long time to pay taxes are more likely to follow the self-sustainability
approach. The tax rate itself, however, is not signicant for many dimensions. The index
of investment freedom is a measure of internal and cross-border restrictions on investment.
Investment freedom positively inuences nancial expenses, whereas it negatively inu-
9For example, La Porta et. al. (1999) nd that better performing governments are larger and collect
higher taxes.
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ences depth measured as the fraction of female clients and scope measured as the ratio of
depositors to borrowers (the latter is only signicant in the 2SFE and median regression
models). The remaining indicators of business environment are only signicant in few of
the models.
As noted, the variable time required to pay taxes may be interpreted as a measure of the
quality of public institutions. Based on the relatively low number of signicant business
environment indicators in addition to time required to pay taxes, it can be concluded that
business environment in itself does not matter much for the MFIs. However, the quality
of public institutions seem to matter for the strategy employed by the MFI, so that higher
quality institutions stimulate the self-sustainability approach among the MFIs.
Each of the remaining indicators of property rights, legal system and governance are
only able to explain a few of the outreach dimensions. This implies that there is no
clear relation between these variables and the poverty approach or the self-sustainability
approach. As was the case with time required to pay taxes, some of these indicators may
both represent the level of bureaucracy and the quality of public institutions. This is for
example the case with the indicator of time required to register property. This variable
positively inuences breadth of outreach, costs per borrower and nancial expenses (the
latter is only signicant in the 2SFE and median regression models). One interpretation
is thus that expenses are higher in countries with slowly working public entities, and a
competing interpretation is that expenses are higher when public institutions are actually
present. Political stability and legal rights measured by cost required to enforce contracts
also signicantly increase cost per borrower and nancial expenses (the latter only in the
2SFE and median regression models) and reduce depth measured as average loan size.
This is probably a result of the fact that many MFIs operate in countries with relatively
low political stability and poor law enforcement. In sum, the second hypothesis cannot
be completely conrmed. The evidence suggests that institutional quality matter more
for sustainability and depth and breadth of outreach than the business and regulatory
environment in general.
Another strategy for interpretation of these results of determinants of outreach is to
consider which of the outcome variables that are mostly inuenced by the framework
conditions. Across the di¤erent estimation strategies represented in table 6, nancial
expense, cost per borrower, average loan size and number of clients are the outcome
variables mostly inuenced by the contextual variables. Financial expense is the variable
most prone to external inuence, and it can be seen that nancial expenses are higher
in countries scoring high on the economic freedom and governance indicators, especially
nancial freedom, investment freedom and regulatory quality. Costs per borrower are
mainly inuenced by the indicators of property rights, legal system and governance and are
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signicantly higher in bureaucratic contexts or in contexts with strong public institutions.
Average loan size (depth of outreach) and number of clients (breadth of outreach) are
mainly inuenced by credit market conditions. As also described above, nancial freedom
stimulates breadth while reducing depth; and higher competitive pressure as represented
by higher private credit coverage is associated with increased depth and reduced breadth
of outreach.
Overall, results indicate that quality of public institutions and the competitive pressure
facing the MFI are important determinants of the strategy employed by the MFI, and
thus of the resulting outcomes on di¤erent dimensions of outreach and sustainability.
Of the many indicators included in the models, mainly the indicators related to the
nancial sector and the quality of public institutions are signicantly able to explain the
performance and outreach dimensions of MFIs.
5 Further analyses and robustness
This section presents two extensions to the analysis. First, a more detailed analysis of the
determinants of sustainability is conducted. This is motivated by the fact that regulators
may be more interested in whether MFIs are sustainable than in the prot level itself,
since sustainable MFIs are able to operate without direct public subsidies (unless they
are sustainable exactly because of such subsidies). Also, the sensitivity of the results
to the nancial performance indicator used is investigated. And second, the scope for
simplication of the framework of outreach is empirically investigated by correlation and
factor analyses.
5.1 Sustainability and external conditions
Given that a MFI is sustainable, it may be argued that the absolute prot level of the MFI
is irrelevant for the policy implications. The policy focus on institutional sustainability
is not justied by the potential level of prots in the sector, rather it is often justied by
the argument that sustainability removes the need for public subsidies. To investigate the
macroeconomic factors behind sustainable institutions, probit models for sustainability
are estimated.
[Table 7]
From table 7 it can be seen that especially GDP per capita is important in explain-
ing institutional sustainability, such that MFIs in countries with high GDP per capita
have a lower probability of being sustainable. With respect to institutional variables,
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the expected relations are found. Higher average loan size, higher number of borrowers
and better portfolio quality (lower PaR 30d) translate into a higher probability of the
institution being sustainable.
[Table 8]
Like in the previous analysis, framework conditions may also have an impact on sus-
tainability. This is the focus of table 8. All indicators used previously have been included
in the models sequentially, however only those indicators in which signicance is estab-
lished in the specications either with or without MFI specic controls are reported in the
table. Generally, it can be seen that the same indicators as found above are signicant
in explaining sustainability. The most important determinant of sustainability, which is
consistent across specications, is scal freedom. For example, consider two otherwise
identical MFIs operating in countries di¤ering on the index of scal freedom (i.e. tax bur-
den). In country A, the scal freedom index is 75.3 (corresponding to the rst quartile of
the sample distribution) whereas in country B it is 84.9 (third quartile). The probability
of the MFI in country B being sustainable is 6.6 % higher than the MFI in country A.
The Doing Business indicator of time required to register property is negatively related
to the probability of being sustainable. Some evidence10 can be found that the variables
time required to pay taxes, monetary freedom and nancial freedom are positively related
to the probability of the MFI being sustainable.
[Table 9]
How sensitive are the results from this study to the choice of nancial performance
measure? To address this question, MPCRE models with return on assets (ROA), return
on equity (ROE) and nominal yield on gross portfolio (YGP) as dependent variables are
compared to the model of OSS (table 9). Taking the di¤erent scales into account, results
using OSS and ROA are very similar. Results using ROE di¤er somewhat more, but are
still comparable. As there is considerable variation in debt/equity ratios among MFIs,
ROA is generally preferred to ROE (Mersland and Strøm, 2008). Results using YGP are
not comparable to the other three protability measures. In sum, this sensitivity analysis
conrms the appropriateness of using OSS as a measure of sustainability.
5.2 Towards composite measures of outreach?
The framework of outreach due to Schreiner (2002), which is used in this analysis, may
appear quite complicated. Additionally, when using this multidimensional framework
10Signicance: p < 0.05 in at least one of the specications.
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in the absence of clear theoretical links between the dimensions, we are mainly able
to estimate reduced form models. Among MFIs and other stakeholders, the general
understanding in its simple form is that there exists a trade-o¤ between protability and
outreach, where outreach is understood mainly as the depth and breadth dimensions of
Schreiners framework (Copestake et.al., 2005; Hatarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). In order
to investigate the scope for simplication of this and future outreach analysis while at
the same time not loosing important theoretical dimensions, it may therefore be useful to
empirically assess whether the di¤erent outreach indicators can be explained by a smaller
number of underlying factors.
[Table 10]
The rst step in this process is to consider simple correlations among the outreach
dimensions. These are given in table 10. The most surprising information from these
pairwise correlations is the high - and positive - correlation coe¢ cient of 0.82 between
average loan amount and cost per borrower. This is surprising as the justication for
high interest rates on MFI loans often is based on the argument that small loans imply
higher xed costs and thereby higher unit costs. However, an explanation for this high
correlation may be that MFIs with higher average loan sizes generally operate in countries
with higher GDP per capita (cf. table 5). In such countries, costs are likely to be higher
in absolute terms as e.g. sta¤, property and operating expenses are higher11.
A substantial negative correlation (-0.56) between average loan size and the proportion
of female clients suggests that both indicators can be used as proxies for depth of outreach.
Evidently, MFIs with low average loan size often also have many female clients. Using
only average loan size to proxy for depth of outreach, as seen in many studies, may thus
be justied by this result. Finally, it can be noted that the variable which have the
highest partial correlations with the other variables is cost per borrower, and arguably,
this variable may therefore catch variation in some of the other dimensions. In particular,
higher costs per borrower is associated with lower depth and breadth of outreach.
[Table 11]
To more formally be able to assess the extent to which the outcome variables can
be explained by a smaller number of underlying factors, a factor analysis is performed.
Results are presented in table 11. Overall, the analysis indicate that outreach cannot
be explained well by a substantially smaller number of factors, i.e. the dimensions of
outreach cannot be reduced substantially without loss of information. This conclusion is
11However, the model in the second column of table 5 provides evidence that even after controlling for
level of GDP per capita, average loan size is positively related to average costs for the median MFI.
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mainly based on two observations. First, the KMO statistic (Kaiser, 1970) is 0.58, which
indicate that the data is not particularly well suited for factor analysis. This is conrmed
by the uniqueness measures reported in the right column of table 11. Uniqueness is the
fraction of variance of the variable that is not explained by the common factors. Since
only cost per borrower and average loan size have uniqueness measures below 0.6, the 4
factors do not seem to be able to explain the variation in the data very well. This point is
reinforced when taking into account that the number of factors which should be retained
is likely to be no more than 1 or 212. For illustrative purposes, however, factor loadings
for all four factors with an eigenvalue greater than 0 are reported in table 11.
As mentioned above, a more simple model of the trade-o¤s facing a MFI posits that a
MFI has a dual mission. The trade-o¤ implied by this representation is two-dimensional.
Put simply, the trade-o¤ is between protability and "outreach", where outreach is dened
in more narrow terms than is the case in this study. Often, the denition of outreach used
corresponds to what is here referred to as depth of outreach. Keeping in mind that
the evidence for a factor structure as reported in table 11 is poor, a slight empirical
justication for this two-dimensional trade-o¤ is evident, however. This can be seen by a
simple interpretation of the factors. The rst factor can be interpreted to represent depth
of outreach as factor loadings on average loan size and proportion of female clients are
relatively high13. The factor loading on proportion of female clients is negative, which
is consistent with the partial correlations reported above. And the factor loading on
number of clients is also negative, although not large. This is evidence that breadth
and depth of outreach are somewhat correlated, so that large institutions also are more
likely to have a low average loan size and a relatively large fraction of female clients. In
total, the rst factor can be interpreted as a measure of depth (and to some extent also
breadth) of outreach. The second factor can be interpreted to be a protability measure,
as OSS has the highest factor loading on this factor. Therefore, one interpretation could
be that the outreach problem is indeed two-dimensional and can be characterized as a
trade-o¤ between depth of outreach and protability. However, given the importance of
each outreach dimension found earlier, and the relative weakness of the factor solution,
this is not su¢ cient evidence for concluding that outreach can be described empirically
by fewer dimensions than Schreiners theory suggested.
12Based on the commonly used "eigenvalue-greater-than-one" rule, 1 factor should be retained, and
based on visual inspection of a scree plot, no more than 2 factors should be retained. For details of these
procedures, see Sharma (1996).
13The fact that the factor loadings on "cost per borrower" and "average loan size" are close to each other
for the rst factor is likely to be a result of the high correlation between the two variables as evidenced
in table 10. This probably also explains the low uniqueness values for exactly those two variables.
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6 Conclusion
This study has used a global sample of MFIs to assess the impact of external economic,
political and institutional factors on the performance and outreach of MFIs. Though the
sample is not representative for MFIs worldwide, it represents a large fraction of the users
of micronancial services globally. Results should be interpreted keeping in mind that
they are based on a subsample of relatively large and well-established MFIs.
The general conclusion is that the performance and outreach of a given MFI cannot
be separated from the context in which it operates. This may be part of an explanation
why imitations of successful MFIs in other economic and political contexts has often been
unsuccessful. And it may also help explaining the large heterogeneity of even the largest
MFIs across the World. This result is important for comparisons of MFIs in di¤erent
contexts and could as such serve as a reminder to organizations comparing and evaluat-
ing performance to appropriately take into account the context in which the institution
operates. Results also indicate that institutional characteristics, eg. ownership, are more
important for performance than the contextual factors.
That said, performance and outreach are inuenced more by some contextual aspects
than other. The overall level of economic development, here represented by GDP per
capita, is an important predictor of the outcomes reached by the MFI. However, economic
growth, population density and ination does not have a large inuence on the outcomes
of MFIs. This is an important conclusion for policy purposes, in that performance and
outreach of MFIs apparently are inuenced more by the level of economic development
than by macroeconomic uctuations. This could also have implications for potential
investors as the correlation between MFI outcomes and alternative investments is likely
to be quite low. However, the data is from the period 2004 - 2008, a period of relatively
high growth rates in the World economy. A repetition of this study with observations
from the current period of macroeconomic slowdown could thus be an interesting future
exercise.
Which policies, then, stimulate MFI performance and outreach? Results from this
study indicate that MFIs are mostly inuenced by nancial sector policies and the quality
of public institutions. The dimensions of outreach mostly inuenced by contextual factors
are the costs, depth and breadth of outreach. Policies most likely to stimulate MFIs
therefore include general interventions aimed at improving institutional quality and more
specic policies of nancial sector development. As the nancial sector in a country
develops and competition increases, MFIs are likely to specialize and to a larger extent
follow a poverty approach. And conversely, in a less developed nancial market context,
MFIs have larger focus on breadth of outreach and can be argued to be more likely to
follow the self-sustainability approach.
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While a substantial focus in this study has been on sustainability of MFIs, it should be
noted that subsidies to MFIs may serve as an alternative to MFIs achieving operational
or nancial sustainability. There may be reasons to believe that publicly subsidized MFIs
are more able to focus on the poorest clients, i.e. to have a larger outreach, than for-
prot MFIs. The results on drivers of sustainability may be used if public institutions
aim at stimulating sustainable MFIs, but an equally valid strategy may be to provide
subsidies to MFIs with the aim of a large outreach, in combination with other development
interventions. The cost-e¤ectiveness of subsidies to MFIs has not been addressed in this
study, but this is an interesting question for further research. Subsidies to MFIs may
not necessarily be as problematic as often claimed, not even in the longer term. This
depend on the relative cost-e¤ectiveness of subsidies to MFIs and all other interventions
and redistributive mechanisms employed by state and non-governmental bodies.
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Variable Source Description Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max
OSS MIX; O Operational Self Sufficiency 3314 1.18 0.53 -0.39 19.39
Sustainable MIX; O = 1 if OSS > 1 3314 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Financial expense MIX Financial expense / assets 3320 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.63
Cost per borrower MIX; O Logarithm of cost per borrower 3220 4.62 1.23 0.00 9.00
PaR 30d MIX Portfolio at Risk > 30 days 3438 0.06 0.09 0.00 1.00
Average loan MIX; O Logarithm of the average loan balance pr. borrower 3727 6.2 1.31 2.20 12.05
Proportion female MIX; O Proportion of borrowers, who are women 3341 0.64 0.26 0.00 1.00
Clients MIX; O Logarithm of the number of active borrowers in the MFI 3755 9.02 1.86 1.39 15.67
Depositor-borrower ratio MIX; O Ratio of depositors to borrowers 3372 1.17 2.76 0.00 85.50
ROA MIX Return on assets 3334 0.01 0.13 -2.14 0.60
ROE MIX Return on equity 3340 0.17 3.56 -44.11 169.31
YGP MIX Nominal Yield on Gross Portfolio 2783 0.35 0.17 0.00 1.88
GDP growth WDI GDP growth (annual) 3803 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.47
GDP pr. capita WDI GDP per capita (1000s  of current US$) 3783 2.48 2.49 0.09 17.86
Inflation WDI Inflation, consumer prices (annual) 3653 0.08 0.09 -0.09 3.02
Population density WDI Population density (100s of people per sq. km) 3783 1.3 1.92 0.02 12.29
Region MIX Dummyvariables for region - - - - -
Age MIX Age of the MFI (years since established) 3829 11.46 9.39 0.00 108.00
Age2 O Age of the MFI squared 3829 219.51 448.16 0.00 11664.00
MF focus MIX; O = 1 if +90% of operations consist of MF 3271 0.83 0.37 0.00 1.00
Regulated MIX = 1 if institution is regulated 3779 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Bank MIX = 1 if institution is a bank 3779 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
Credit union MIX = 1 if institution is a Credit Union / Cooperative 3951 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
NBFI MIX = 1 if institution is a Non-bank Financial Institution 3951 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
NGO MIX = 1 if institution is a NGO 3951 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
Other MIX = 1 if institution is another type (residual category) 3951 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Rural bank MIX = 1 if institution is a rural bank 3951 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00
Ln(assets) MIX; O Logarithm of total assets 3839 15.53 1.94 8.25 21.86
PaR 30d MIX Portfolio at Risk 3438 0.06 0.09 0.00 1.00
* Some of these are also used as independent variables in some regressions. 
Note: MIX: Microfinance Information eXchange; WDI: World Development Indicators (World Bank); O: Own calculations
MFI-specific control variables
Macroeconomic variables
Dependent variables*
Table 1: Description of control and other variables used in baseline models
Variable Source Description Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max
Time to start business DB Time required to start a business (days) 3775 54.98 33.25 6.00 202.00
Cost to start business DB Cost required to start a business (% of p.c. income) 3775 78.02 127.21 0.90 1540.20
Time to register property DB Time required to register property (days) 3151 80.94 97.80 2.00 683.00
Cost to register property DB Cost required to register property (% of property value) 3151 5.63 4.67 0.00 30.80
Credit rights index DB Strength of legal rights for borrovers and lenders, index (0-10) 3153 4.46 2.11 0.00 10.00
Private credit coverage DB Adults registered in a private credit bureau (% of adult population) 3067 13.79 22.53 0.00 100.00
Time to pay taxes DB Time required to pay 3 major types of taxes (hours/year) 2426 456.01 397.14 96.00 2600.00
Tax rate DB Total tax rate as % of profits 2426 51.61 30.93 0.00 292.40
Time to enforce contracts DB Time used to enforce a typical contract (days) 3775 687.12 331.73 195.00 1642.00
Cost to enforce contracts DB Cost required to enforce contracts (% of claim) 3789 36.17 24.81 0.00 151.80
CPI TI Corruption perception index (0-10) 3738 2.85 0.76 1.30 7.40
Economic Freedom Index HF Index of economic freedom, composed of the sub-indices below (0-100) 3277 57.49 5.70 34.40 78.60
Business Freedom HF Index: Business freedom based on "Doing Business" (0-100) 3277 58.06 9.85 26.80 85.00
Fiscal Freedom HF Index measuring tax burden (0-100) 3277 79.46 7.71 46.00 96.70
Freedom from Government HF Index of government spending, high spending -> low values (0-100) 3277 79.55 12.32 18.30 96.90
Monetary Freedom HF Index of inflation and price controls (0-100) 3276 75.82 7.20 13.10 90.40
Investment Freedom HF Index of restrictions imposed on investment (0-100) 3277 46.37 14.40 10.00 90.00
Financial Freedom HF Index of banking security and independence from government control (0-100) 3277 50.22 16.36 10.00 90.00
Property Freedom HF Index of property rights and enforcement (0-100) 3277 34.91 11.36 10.00 90.00
Voice and accountability WGI Index of democracy, freedom of expression and association and free media 3785 -0.31 0.58 -1.91 1.21
Political Stability WGI Index of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 3785 -0.72 0.67 -3.06 0.94
Government Effectiveness WGI Index of quality of public services 3785 -0.47 0.42 -1.89 1.25
Regulatory Quality WGI Index of regulatory quality with focus on private sector policies 3785 -0.35 0.48 -2.37 1.58
Rule of Law WGI Index of rule of law 3785 -0.63 0.44 -2.07 1.25
Note: DB: Doing Business (World Bank); TI: Transparency International; HF: Heritage Foundation; WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank)
Table 2: Description of framework condition indicators
Dependent variable: OSS
OLS FE RE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
GDP Growth 0.436 0.287 0.220 0.750** 0.631*** 0.700*** 1.060*** 1.245**
(0.311) (0.355) (0.308) (0.345) (0.184) (0.174) (0.233) (0.558)
GDP pr. capita -0.0211*** 0.00963 -0.00224 -0.0204** -0.0139*** -0.0132*** -0.0131*** -0.0200*
(0.00543) (0.0203) (0.00913) (0.00911) (0.00362) (0.00225) (0.00450) (0.0102)
Inflation 0.0205 0.0561 0.0324 -0.355 0.0107 0.0864 0.118 -0.00188
(0.0638) (0.186) (0.121) (0.267) (0.209) (0.0673) (0.111) (0.112)
Population density 0.00101 -0.123 0.00433 -0.0108 0.00271 0.00564 0.00326 -0.00297
(0.00554) (0.180) (0.0136) (0.00745) (0.00325) (0.00443) (0.00567) (0.00987)
Age 0.0111*** -0.0986 0.00734 0.0416*** 0.0186*** 0.00982*** 0.00652*** 0.00783*
(0.00363) (0.144) (0.00724) (0.00423) (0.00335) (0.00214) (0.00240) (0.00429)
Age squared -0.000174*** -5.26e-05 -0.000128* -0.000805*** -0.000348*** -0.000179*** -9.04e-05* -0.000123*
(6.30e-05) (0.000286) (7.49e-05) (0.000106) (7.60e-05) (5.04e-05) (5.00e-05) (6.77e-05)
MF focus 0.0296 0.0166 -0.00954 0.0207 -0.00604 0.00847 0.0874*
(0.0304) (0.100) (0.0256) (0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0293) (0.0521)
Regulated -0.0130 0.0152 0.00833 0.0168 0.0277* 0.0258 -0.00757
(0.0265) (0.0895) (0.0319) (0.0212) (0.0158) (0.0286) (0.0462)
Credit union 0.0612 0.191 -0.0329 -0.0285 -0.0176 -0.00763 0.0782
(0.0673) (0.215) (0.0418) (0.0239) (0.0226) (0.0381) (0.0935)
NBFI 0.0429* 0.0722 -0.0204 -0.00983 0.0377* 0.0670** 0.0980**
(0.0249) (0.0785) (0.0319) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0293) (0.0492)
NGO -0.0161 0.0309 -0.184*** -0.0908*** 0.000284 0.0920*** 0.184***
(0.0306) (0.101) (0.0414) (0.0243) (0.0224) (0.0353) (0.0672)
Other 0.465*** 0.417 0.475*** 0.249 0.511*** 0.482*** 0.650***
(0.107) (0.261) (0.0787) (0.161) (0.152) (0.186) (0.183)
Rural bank 0.0314 0.0706 -0.0396 -0.0214 0.00905 -0.00326 0.101
(0.0385) (0.119) (0.0720) (0.0283) (0.0272) (0.0476) (0.0862)
Observations 2642 2642 2642 2642 2642 2642 2642 2642
MFIs 680 680 680 680 680 680 680 680
Adj. R-squared / pseudo R-sq 0.030 0.003 0.0138 0.1474 0.0686 0.048 0.0474 0.055
Quantile regression estimates
Table 3: Baseline models for sustainability (OSS)
Note: Robust standard errors in parantheses. Quantile regressions are estimated simultaneously and standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replications. 
Time- and regional dummies are included in all regressions. Dummies for Africa  and Bank are excluded to avoid perfect multicollinearity.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable: OSS
OLS FE RE 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
GDP Growth 0.455 0.161 0.111 1.013*** 0.811*** 0.637*** 0.845*** 0.907*
(0.367) (0.445) (0.381) (0.317) (0.195) (0.220) (0.257) (0.526)
GDP pr. capita -0.0220*** 0.00116 -0.00875 -0.0236*** -0.0157*** -0.0103*** -0.0103* -0.00854
(0.00658) (0.0243) (0.0102) (0.00572) (0.00360) (0.00366) (0.00592) (0.0117)
Inflation 0.0900 0.0344 0.0315 0.180 0.238* 0.189*** 0.143 0.0124
(0.0596) (0.217) (0.127) (0.253) (0.133) (0.0467) (0.118) (0.122)
Population density 0.00281 -0.133 0.00776 -0.00485 -0.000981 0.00343 0.00264 -0.00762
(0.00606) (0.239) (0.0139) (0.00704) (0.00477) (0.00433) (0.00579) (0.0103)
Age 0.00978** -0.140*** 0.00905 0.0185*** 0.0116*** 0.00472** 0.00383 0.00546
(0.00386) (0.0487) (0.00840) (0.00485) (0.00268) (0.00231) (0.00380) (0.00681)
Age squared -0.000204*** 4.78e-05 -0.000198 -0.000409*** -0.000225*** -8.08e-05* -8.08e-05 -0.000129
(7.52e-05) (0.000263) (0.000132) (0.000107) (5.96e-05) (4.89e-05) (7.37e-05) (0.000130)
MF focus 0.00484 0.00918 0.0115 0.0352 -0.0256 -0.0182 -0.0325
(0.0374) (0.115) (0.0306) (0.0293) (0.0222) (0.0344) (0.0635)
Regulated -0.0195 0.0112 -0.0412 -0.0202 0.00734 0.0109 -0.0141
(0.0349) (0.0984) (0.0372) (0.0203) (0.0168) (0.0319) (0.0577)
Ln(average loan) (t-1) 0.0678*** 0.0413 0.0540 0.140*** 0.0922*** 0.0571*** 0.0259* 0.0351
(0.0179) (0.0699) (0.0438) (0.0177) (0.0114) (0.0106) (0.0141) (0.0266)
Ln(borrowers) (t-1) 0.0113 -0.0223 -0.0192 0.0624*** 0.0356*** 0.0279*** 0.0193** 0.0307**
(0.0162) (0.0743) (0.0377) (0.00954) (0.00603) (0.00657) (0.00759) (0.0147)
PAR 30d (t-1) -0.666*** -0.380*** -0.470*** -0.683*** -0.651*** -0.688*** -0.780*** -0.786***
(0.203) (0.130) (0.133) (0.155) (0.149) (0.129) (0.158) (0.191)
Proportion female (t-1) 0.0730 0.226* 0.209* 0.180*** 0.0511 -0.00594 -0.0476 -0.0296
(0.106) (0.134) (0.113) (0.0690) (0.0443) (0.0391) (0.0546) (0.0921)
Observations 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106 2,106
MFIs 623 623 623 623 623 623 623 623
Adj. R-squared / pseudo R-sq 0.039 0.011 0.010 0.216 0.120 0.081 0.067 0.071
Note: Estimations control for time, region and institutional type. See also note to table 3.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Quantile regression estimates
Table 4: Baseline models for sustainability with MFI-specific controls
Breadth Scope Length
Financial expense Cost per borrower PaR 30d Average loan Proportion female Clients Depositor-borrower ratio OSS
Poverty approach +/- +/- +/- - + - - -
Self-sustainability approach +/- +/- +/- + - + + +
GDP Growth 0.0259 0.0875 -0.0260 0.734 0.146 -0.527 -0.150 0.142†
(0.0365) (0.332) (0.0255) (0.616) (0.125) (0.956) (0.197) (0.289)
GDP pr. capita 0.00438*† 0.0407*† 0.00402***† 0.0867***† 0.00792† 0.00675 0.00353 -0.0345**†
(0.00233) (0.0216) (0.00140) (0.0272) (0.00912) (0.0542) (0.00809) (0.0150)
Inflation 0.0314 0.0258 -0.0309** 1.094*** 0.0998 0.289 0.00174 0.103
(0.0217) (0.274) (0.0155) (0.396) (0.0839) (0.649) (0.0769) (0.191)
Population density -0.0144† 0.621***† 0.0411† 0.170 0.0561 0.113† 0.524† -0.143
(0.0159) (0.234) (0.0284) (0.241) (0.0484) (0.699) (0.402) (0.174)
Age 0.000836 -0.00124 0.00103**† 0.0524***† 0.00238† 0.159***† -0.0150* 0.00522*
(0.000513) (0.00664) (0.000409) (0.0118) (0.00294) (0.0219) (0.00888) (0.00308)
Age squared -0.0000178*† 3.47e-05 -1.50e-05† -0.000844***† -3.56e-05 -0.00279***† 0.000622*† -8.93e-05
(1.04e-05) (0.000154) (1.06e-05) (0.000242) (7.19e-05) (0.000487) (0.000339) (6.75e-05)
MF focus -0.000852 0.0368 -0.000663 0.0515 0.0512** 1.027*** 0.00946 -0.0159
(0.00455) (0.0726) (0.00416) (0.0911) (0.0224) (0.213) (0.0313) (0.0349)
Regulated 0.00155 -0.106 -0.00848*** 0.183** -0.00634 0.732*** 0.0276 0.0125
(0.00355) (0.0670) (0.00326) (0.0829) (0.0213) (0.167) (0.0377) (0.0288)
Credit Union / Cooperative -0.0154** -0.718*** 0.00950 -0.388** -0.0653 -2.149*** 1.027*** 0.0179
(0.00675) (0.109) (0.00635) (0.167) (0.0405) (0.349) (0.374) (0.0426)
NBFI -0.00426 -0.218** 0.00507 -0.512*** -0.00979 -1.622*** -0.621*** 0.0934**
(0.00525) (0.0951) (0.00422) (0.150) (0.0245) (0.303) (0.158) (0.0363)
NGO -0.00941 -0.429*** 0.000795 -0.892*** 0.0100 -1.951*** -0.650*** 0.100***
(0.00675) (0.106) (0.00568) (0.160) (0.0343) (0.367) (0.144) (0.0385)
Other -0.0475** -0.951 0.00397 0.864 0.175 -2.688*** -0.688*** 0.541***
(0.0228) (0.953) (0.00910) (1.106) (0.118) (0.411) (0.189) (0.0679)
Rural Bank -0.00633 -0.442*** 0.0356** -0.682*** -0.0229 -2.122*** -0.107 0.0985*
(0.00892) (0.141) (0.0163) (0.209) (0.0866) (0.434) (0.332) (0.0534)
Ln(average loan) (t-1) 0.0111***† 0.333***† 0.000971 -0.0447***† 0.0182† 0.00740† 0.0796***†
(0.00387) (0.0537) (0.00354) (0.0159) (0.119) (0.0178) (0.0281)
Ln(borrowers) (t-1) 0.00927***† -0.140***† 0.00492** -0.0747*† 0.00413 -0.00605† 0.0269
(0.00242) (0.0340) (0.00239) (0.0400) (0.00870) (0.0124) (0.0234)
PAR 30d (t-1) -0.00690 0.287† 0.517 -0.162† -1.132***† -0.0209 -0.438***†
(0.0144) (0.201) (0.449) (0.119) (0.430) (0.0876) (0.149)
Proportion female (t-1) -0.0107 -0.335** -0.00899† -0.715**† 0.273 0.00489† 0.0850
(0.00966) (0.141) (0.0110) (0.318) (0.370) (0.0478) (0.0853)
Observations 2,109 2,113 2,303 2,155 2,155 2,155 1,953 2,106
Note: Values are parameter estimates from MPCRE median regressions. Standard errors in parantheses are bootstrapped blockwise with 400 replications. 
Estimations control for time and region.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, †Significant (p<0.1) and of same sign in a similar 2SFE model AND an ordinary median regression model (only time varying variables).
Cost Depth
Table 5: Baseline models of outreach
Breadth Scope Length
Dependent variable Financial expense Cost per borrower PaR 30d Average loan Proportion female Clients Depositor-borrower ratio OSS
Poverty approach +/- +/- +/- - + - - -
Self-sustainability approach +/- +/- +/- + - + + +
Credit rights index 0.000790† 0.00315 0.00177** -0.000643 0.00320† 0.0238 -0.00367† 0.000110
(0.000818) (0.0119) (0.000753) (0.0171) (0.00409) (0.0349) (0.00440) (0.00655)
Private credit coverage -4.55e-05 0.000907 5.21e-05 -0.00330**† -0.000730* -0.00659*† 0.000102 -0.00112**†
(8.97e-05) (0.000962) (7.44e-05) (0.00163) (0.000386) (0.00374) (0.000397) (0.000508)
Financial Freedom 0.000227**† 0.00479* 0.000168* 0.00902***† 0.000754 0.0140***† -0.000376 -0.000293†
(0.000102) (0.00253) (8.64e-05) (0.00296) (0.000677) (0.00517) (0.000596) (0.000771)
Time to start business 5.63e-05 0.00173*† 1.33e-05 0.00153† -1.93e-05 0.00146 -0.000380† 0.000274
(4.81e-05) (0.000902) (4.32e-05) (0.00107) (0.000243) (0.00175) (0.000518) (0.000360)
Cost to start business -3.91e-06 4.10e-06 -1.15e-05 0.000483 1.42e-05 0.000169 -0.000213† -0.000107†
(1.09e-05) (0.000332) (1.27e-05) (0.000500) (8.22e-05) (0.000576) (0.000280) (0.000145)
Business Freedom -0.000150† -0.00281 0.000108† -0.00756**† -0.000909 0.00964 0.000541 -0.000907
(0.000150) (0.00288) (0.000117) (0.00331) (0.001000) (0.00665) (0.000895) (0.00122)
Investment Freedom 0.000321***† 0.000481 0.000142 -0.00338 -0.00141***† 0.00535 -0.00145† -0.000350
(9.26e-05) (0.00163) (8.88e-05) (0.00230) (0.000530) (0.00465) (0.00115) (0.000777)
Time to pay taxes -1.52e-05***† -5.17e-05† -9.09e-06**† -0.000123† -5.36e-05**† 0.000122† 1.50e-05† 8.57e-05***†
(4.77e-06) (9.81e-05) (3.77e-06) (8.85e-05) (2.45e-05) (0.000230) (2.14e-05) (3.13e-05)
Tax rate 0.000133† -0.000314 -5.47e-06 -0.00147 -0.000243 0.00312 -0.000202† -0.000829†
(0.000106) (0.00124) (8.22e-05) (0.00180) (0.000379) (0.00351) (0.000574) (0.000578)
Table continued on next page
Table 6: Determinants of outreach - MPCRE estimates
Cost Depth
Credit market conditions
Business environment
Table 6 cont'd Breadth Scope Length
Dependent variable Financial expense Cost per borrower PaR 30d Average loan Proportion female Clients Depositor-borrower ratio OSS
Poverty approach +/- +/- +/- - + - - -
Self-sustainability approach +/- +/- +/- + - + + +
Time to register property 2.51e-05† 0.00112***† -2.54e-06 0.000741* 4.05e-05† 0.00174**† 0.000159 -0.000105
(2.18e-05) (0.000272) (1.81e-05) (0.000421) (9.14e-05) (0.000747) (0.000274) (0.000158)
Cost to register property 0.000204 0.0101 -0.000482 -0.00211 -0.00112 0.00846 -0.00124 0.00217
(0.000349) (0.0109) (0.000405) (0.0122) (0.00357) (0.0173) (0.00394) (0.00327)
Property Freedom 7.27e-05 0.000625 0.000140 -0.00374 0.000485 0.000863 -0.00572*† 0.00139
(0.000163) (0.00332) (0.000132) (0.00405) (0.000952) (0.00707) (0.00296) (0.00130)
Time to enforce contracts 1.29e-05*† -0.000171*† 8.62e-06† 0.000201 -6.37e-06 -9.56e-05 -6.43e-05† -3.61e-05
(7.45e-06) (9.36e-05) (5.29e-06) (0.000142) (2.67e-05) (0.000323) (5.28e-05) (4.13e-05)
Cost to enforce contracts 7.17e-05† 0.00281*† -3.84e-05 0.00301*† -0.000106 0.00307 -0.000837† -0.000252
(7.49e-05) (0.00165) (5.33e-05) (0.00167) (0.000369) (0.00327) (0.00124) (0.000556)
Rule of Law 0.00768*† 0.00541 0.00231 0.0403 -0.0188† -0.0313 -0.0462 -0.00158
(0.00402) (0.0688) (0.00323) (0.105) (0.0264) (0.179) (0.0375) (0.0224)
Corruption (CPI) 0.000620 -0.0207 0.00197 0.0687† -0.00551 -0.0498 -0.0290 0.0143†
(0.00222) (0.0387) (0.00188) (0.0662) (0.0138) (0.102) (0.0212) (0.0136)
Fiscal Freedom -0.000189 0.00591† -0.000439**† -0.00207 -0.000192 -0.0113 -0.000143 0.00349**
(0.000212) (0.00443) (0.000189) (0.00559) (0.00142) (0.00936) (0.00170) (0.00175)
Freedom from Government -0.000156 0.00380† 6.68e-05 -0.00819** -0.000518 -0.0125**† -5.09e-05 0.00168†
(0.000157) (0.00265) (0.000133) (0.00328) (0.000631) (0.00618) (0.00100) (0.00131)
Monetary Freedom -0.000146 -0.00838** 0.000337* 0.00430 -0.000117 0.0271**† 4.11e-05 0.00221
(0.000261) (0.00349) (0.000184) (0.00491) (0.00123) (0.0109) (0.00126) (0.00176)
Voice and accountability 0.00933*** 0.136** 0.00291 0.0709 -0.00230 0.243* -0.0305 -0.0164
(0.00289) (0.0581) (0.00252) (0.0810) (0.0172) (0.125) (0.0283) (0.0192)
Political Stability 0.00296† 0.0848*† -0.00259 0.176***† 0.00999 -0.189† -0.00854 0.00836
(0.00268) (0.0489) (0.00213) (0.0654) (0.0132) (0.124) (0.0155) (0.0175)
Government Effectiveness 0.00707* 0.0720† 0.00580 -0.0332 -0.0220† 0.131 -0.0723 -0.00323
(0.00409) (0.0742) (0.00398) (0.108) (0.0285) (0.204) (0.0465) (0.0275)
Regulatory Quality 0.0105***† 0.0431 0.0101***† 0.0105 -0.0118 0.260† -0.0445 0.0200
(0.00351) (0.0538) (0.00292) (0.0895) (0.0187) (0.174) (0.0345) (0.0230)
Note: Each cell is the coefficient from a MPCRE median regression with dependent variable as given in the column header. Regressions control for all variables in table 4 as well.
Standard errors in parantheses are bootstrapped blockwise with 400 replications.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, †Significant (p<0.1) and of same sign in a similar 2SFE model AND an ordinary median regression model.
Governance
Property rights and legal system
Cost Depth
GDP Growth 0.443 0.791**
(0.366) (0.400)
GDP pr. capita -0.0209*** -0.0253***
(0.00569) (0.00614)
Inflation 0.0313 0.172**
(0.0853) (0.0731)
Population density 0.00471 0.00530
(0.00859) (0.00842)
Age 0.0244*** 0.0108**
(0.00406) (0.00464)
Age squared -0.000478*** -0.000259**
(9.56e-05) (0.000111)
MF focus 0.0539 0.0312
(0.0393) (0.0400)
Regulated 0.0258 -0.000540
(0.0317) (0.0318)
Credit Union / Cooperative -0.0715 0.0205
(0.0574) (0.0555)
NBFI -0.0429 0.0530
(0.0441) (0.0495)
NGO -0.167*** 0.000581
(0.0547) (0.0578)
Rural Bank 0.0992 0.127***
(0.0642) (0.0433)
Ln(average loan) (t-1) 0.122***
(0.0167)
Ln(borrowers) (t-1) 0.0430***
(0.00830)
PAR 30d (t-1) -0.568***
(0.133)
Proportion female (t-1) 0.103
(0.0642)
Observations 2,635 2,101
Estimations control for time and region. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: Probit models for sustainability
Note: Values are marginal effects from probit regressions. 
Standard errors in parantheses are clustered at the MFI level. 
Without MFI specific controls With MFI specific controls
Time to register property -0.000382* -0.000345*
(0.000199) (0.000183)
Private credit coverage -0.00144* -0.000986
(0.000742) (0.000734)
Time to pay taxes 4.30e-05 7.21e-05**
(3.64e-05) (3.66e-05)
Fiscal Freedom 0.00664*** 0.00683***
(0.00195) (0.00192)
Monetary Freedom 0.00415** 0.00220
(0.00179) (0.00176)
Financial Freedom 0.00232** 0.000214
(0.000988) (0.000921)
Property Freedom 0.00197 0.00248*
(0.00144) (0.00141)
established in one of the specifications are reported here. 
Table 8: Probit estimates for sustainability
Note: Each cell presents the marginal effect from a probit regression. 
Estimations control for all variables in table 7. 
Models for all indicators in table 6 are estimated. Only variables for which significance is 
Standard errors in parantheses are clustered at the MFI level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent variable OSS ROA ROE YGP
GDP Growth 0.142 0.0314 -0.0114 0.0987
(0.362) (0.0616) (0.136) (0.107)
GDP per capita -0.0345** -0.00709*** -0.0113 0.00553
(0.0154) (0.00266) (0.00898) (0.00617)
Inflation 0.103 0.0216 0.283** -0.00300
(0.201) (0.0338) (0.116) (0.0726)
Population density -0.143 -0.0181 -0.103 0.0191
(0.182) (0.0277) (0.135) (0.0630)
Age 0.00522* 0.00125** 0.00246 0.000944
(0.00305) (0.000593) (0.00209) (0.00201)
Age squared -8.93e-05 -2.47e-05* -5.11e-05 -1.94e-05
(6.84e-05) (1.31e-05) (4.68e-05) (4.39e-05)
MF Focus -0.0159 0.00174 -0.0131 0.0202
(0.0360) (0.00626) (0.0191) (0.0169)
Regulated 0.0125 -0.00396 0.00437 -0.0187
(0.0267) (0.00498) (0.0163) (0.0128)
C di U i / C i 0 0179 0 00716 0 0179 0 109***
Table 9: Sensitivity analysis: Models of financial performance
re t n on  ooperat ve . . . - .
(0.0421) (0.00836) (0.0308) (0.0248)
NBFI 0.0934*** 0.0206*** 0.0479* -0.00383
(0.0350) (0.00682) (0.0251) (0.0218)
NGO 0.100** 0.0238*** 0.0355 -0.0327
(0.0394) (0.00800) (0.0257) (0.0240)
Other 0.541*** -0.00985 -0.0953* -0.109
(0.0690) (0.0112) (0.0543) (0.180)
Rural Bank 0.0985* 0.0239** 0.0682 0.00461
(0.0506) (0.00957) (0.0434) (0.0385)
Observations 2,106 2,112 2,113 1,801
Adj. R-squared / pseudo R-sq 0.0859 0.0640 0.0375 0.2291
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Estimations control for time, region, institutional type and MFI specific controls.
Financial expense Cost per borrower PaR 30d Average loan Proportion female Clients Depositor-borrower ratio OSS
Financial expense 1.0000
Cost per borrower 0.1023*  1.0000
PaR 30d -0.0594* 0.0592* 1.0000
Average loan 0.1678*  0.8228* -0.0218 1.0000
Proportion female -0.0031  -0.4627* -0.0763*  -0.5598*  1.0000
Clients 0.0232 -0.3885* -0.0919* -0.2711* 0.1959* 1.0000
Depositor-borrower ratio -0.1124*  0.1541* 0.0658*  0.0993* -0.0712* -0.0610* 1.0000
OSS -0.0535* -0.1292* -0.1396*  0.0860* -0.0500*  0.0214 -0.0481* 1.0000
Table 10: Pairwise correlations between outcome variables
Note: * denotes significance at p < 0.01. 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Uniqueness
Financial expense 0.12 0.05 0.36 0.08 0.15 -0.04 0.35 0.06 0.85
Cost per borrower 0.88 -0.17 0.09 -0.02 0.88 -0.20 0.00 -0.09 0.18
PaR 30d 0.06 -0.33 -0.14 0.02 0.04 -0.30 -0.21 -0.04 0.86
Average loan 0.91 0.20 0.04 0.05 0.92 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.13
Proportion female -0.59 -0.08 0.19 -0.08 -0.58 -0.09 0.20 -0.07 0.60
Clients -0.42 0.16 0.05 0.22 -0.41 0.12 0.11 0.25 0.75
Depositor-borrower ratio 0.09 -0.08 -0.20 0.16 0.08 -0.07 -0.21 0.14 0.92
OSS 0.01 0.53 -0.12 -0.07 0.03 0.55 -0.02 0.02 0.70
Eigenvalue 2.1588 0.5025 0.2486 0.0918
LR test (chi2(28)) (p-value) 5502.3 (0.0000)
KMO statistic 0.5778
Observations 2541
Unrotated factor loadings Varimax rotation
Table 11: Factor analysis of outcome variables
